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Abstract: 
 
Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or 
distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to 
counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated 
that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases 
toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, 
following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. 
People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current 
skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, 
skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They 
did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show 
hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics. 
 
Psychology and its allied disciplines have long struggled to accurately assess change, whether that ostensible 
change results from maturation, senescence, laboratory experimental manipulations, psychotherapeutic 
techniques, community interventions, or educational programs (see, e.g., Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Hertzog & 
Nesselroade, 2003; Lord, 1956, 1967; Nesselroade, Stigler, & Baltes, 1980; Rubin, 1974). Of course, in 
contexts in which the desired change is entirely subjective—as is the case with attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, 
evaluations, or emotional states—the risks of misidentifying or misinterpreting change will only increase, since 
subjects’ self-reports may be biased, distorted, or erroneous (see, e.g., Conway & Ross, 1984; Festinger, 1957; 
Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, & Eskenazi, 1991; Hoogstraten, 1979; Kirsch, 1985; Lewinsohn & 
Rosenbaum, 1987; Loftus, 1979; H. Markus & Kunda, 1986; Orne, 1962; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Researchers 
must therefore develop statistical and methodological tools to help discriminate real from illusory change. The 
present study demonstrated a seemingly paradoxical approach, whereby a powerful cognitive bias was 
strategically deployed as a means to counter another, especially formidable bias that plagues assessment of 
subjective change —here, in the context of an educational intervention designed to affect undergraduates’ 
beliefs. 
 
Education and Paranormal Belief 
 
Most Americans, even many with advanced educational degrees, hold paranormal, superstitious, or 
pseudoscientific beliefs, such as belief in extrasensory perception (ESP), alien abduction, or creationism 
(Moore, 2005; Newport & Strausberg, 2001; Rice, 2003). Indeed, neither general science knowledge nor a 
scientific major consistently hinders such beliefs (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Goode, 2002). Limited research 
suggests, however, that university courses that directly and skeptically examine paranormal and 
pseudoscientific phenomena may reduce students’ beliefs in them, at least in the short term. 
 
Unfortunately, this literature is limited in both size and methodological rigor. Of the dozen or so published stud-
ies on educational interventions and paranormal belief, only three included control groups (students in unrelated 
courses; see Dougherty, 2004; Gray, 1985; Morier & Keeports, 1994);
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 furthermore, some studies included only 
postcourse evaluations with no pre-to-post comparisons (Broch, 2000; Calvin, 2009), and most studies asked 
students to report their beliefs without anonymity (Banziger, 1983; Emme, 1940; Gilliland, 1930; Jones & 
Zusne, 1981; McBurney, 1976; Swords, 1990; Tobacyk, 1983). Most reports of education-induced paranormal 
belief change may thus have derived simply from passing time (or other external influences) or from students’ 
reaction to their identifiabilty. These are significant and rather obvious interpretive obstacles. However, even 
studies comparing paranormal-skepticism courses with controls, with anonymous belief reporting, likely 
suffered from an additional problem, demand characteristics (Orne, 1962): Students may simply have provided 
the instructor-as-investigator with the obviously desired responses (i.e., that they are now more skeptical of the 
paranormal than they were before). Of course, such demand characteristics may contaminate the assessment of 
any experimental, educational, or clinical interventions designed to change subjective outcomes (see, e.g., 
Laney et al., 2008). But is there a compelling way around them? 
 
Debiasing via Hindsight Bias 
 
The present study harnessed a much-studied cognitive bias—hindsight—as a novel means to circumvent 
demand characteristics in self-reported psychological change. Laboratory investigations of hindsight bias 
typically ask subjects to predict event outcomes or to answer trivia questions before providing them with the 
actual outcomes or answers (Fischhoff, 1975; for a review, see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Hindsight bias occurs 
when outcome knowledge colors subjects’ subsequent reports (and, ostensibly, beliefs) about their initial state 
of knowledge, such that they ―knew it all along‖ (Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981). Most relevant to the present 
study, hindsight has also been demonstrated beyond the cognitive psychology laboratory, with people’s current 
attitudes and beliefs biasing their recollections of their own personal past, in a form of false memory (Ross, 
1989). For example, when adults recall their adolescent political attitudes and beliefs, previous emotions, or 
substance use, their recollections are strongly influenced (and sometimes, most strongly influenced) by their 
current attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, rather than by their actual past attitudes and behaviors (see, 
e.g., Collins, Graham, Hansen, & Johnson, 1985; Field, Thompson, & Gallagher-Thompson, 2006; G. B. 
Markus, 1986). This holds even following a challenge to one’s beliefs, such as writing a counter-attitudinal 
essay: Students who chose to write an essay arguing against their belief that students should have considerable 
control over the courses taught at their university subsequently misremembered that they had previously held 
that belief much less strongly than they actually did (Bem & McConnell, 1970). It seems, then, that adults 
generally hold implicit theories of belief and trait stability, even in the face of potentially change-inducing 
events, and so when they recall their past actions and opinions they are unduly influenced by their psychological 
present (Ross, 1989). Thus, if I am skeptical of the paranormal now, for example, then I am likely to remember 
myself—rightly or wrongly—as having been similarly skeptical in the past. 
 
To exploit such hindsight systematically, we anonymously probed university students’ paranormal beliefs pre-
ceding and following a semester-long skepticism course, versus control courses, in two ways. Half of each class 
reported their current beliefs at both times (the typical, demand-vulnerable procedure); the other half reported 
their current beliefs at Time 1 but tried to reproduce exactly their Time 1 responses at Time 2 from memory (the 
hindsight procedure). Given actual belief change (toward nonbelief), skepticism students should have reported 
their Time 2 paranormal beliefs to have been weaker than those at Time 1, and weaker than those of Time 2 
controls. Moreover—and critically—with the hindsight procedure, they (but not controls) should have recalled 
themselves as having been more skeptical at Time 1 than they actually were. 
 
METHOD 
 
We compared pre- with postcourse paranormal beliefs in both skepticism courses (precourse N = 340) and 
control courses (precourse N = 238). The semester-long skepticism course (PSY 318, Belief in “Weird” Things) 
was taught over three different semesters by the first author at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
(UNCG), a comprehensive state university in the southeastern U.S. with an introductory psychology 
prerequisite (syllabi available at www.uncg.edu/~mjkane/memlab.html). Through lectures, readings, videos, 
and demonstrations (from classic memory experiments to mentalist magic tricks), the course focused on the 
philosophy and methods of science, the idea and perils of naive realism, various cognitive biases and illusions 
that may create and sustain false beliefs, and the empirical evidence (pro and con) regarding many paranormal 
and pseudoscientific phenomena. The instructor repeatedly made it clear that students would not be graded on 
the basis of their beliefs and that, beyond two anonymous surveys, they would never be asked to reveal their 
beliefs in the course context. 
 
Control classes were three semester-long UNCG psychology courses with identical prerequisites, each taught by 
a different instructor (including one by the third author); they were survey courses in developmental 
psychology; cognitive psychology; and sex, gender, and behavior. Skepticism and control classes had 
equivalent subject-retention rates (56% and 57%, respectively) between Time 1 (precourse) and Time 2 
(postcourse). Lost data reflected course withdrawals, isolated absences from class when questionnaires were 
administered, or students’ failure to use the same identity-protecting PIN code on both pre- and postcourse 
questionnaires. 
 
We collected belief-report measures from skepticism courses at the very beginning of the first and last classes, 
and from control courses some time during the first and last 1.5 weeks of the semester. At Time 1, all students 
responded according to their current beliefs. At Time 2, we color-coded belief measures and distributed them 
pseudorandomly from a shuffled pile (by seating); students who received questionnaires in one color reported 
their current beliefs (the typical procedure), and students who received them in the other color did so by 
recollecting their Time 1 belief reports (the hindsight procedure). To emphasize to hindsight-questionnaire 
students that we wanted them to accurately recall their prior beliefs in an unbiased way (i.e., to create an 
―experimental demand‖ for memory accuracy; Bem & McConnell, 1970; Fischhoff, 1977), we wrote the 
following instructions on the questionnaires and reinforced them orally: ―Please read each statement and try to 
recall how strongly you either believed or disbelieved in it the last time you completed this questionnaire, by 
circling a number from 1–7. We do not want you to respond according to your current beliefs, but rather accord-
ing to your beliefs before you took this course . . .‖ (all emphases in the original). Students created PIN codes 
for their Time 1 and Time 2 measures to allow anonymous linking of individual students’ pre- and postcourse 
responses. We collected no demographic information, in order to satisfy IRB concerns about student anonymity 
given that the subjects were also the investigators’ students. 
 
The belief-report measure presented 52 items representing seven categories: psychics/ESP, alternative 
medicine/healing, superstitions/ omens, UFOs/alien abduction, astrology, creationism, and Judeo-
Christian/biblical (for the complete measure, see www.uncg.edu/~mjkane/memlab.html). Judeo-
Christian/biblical beliefs, aside from creationism, were not addressed in the course materials but acted as a 
control category. For all items, students rated their belief on 7-point scales anchored by 1 (strongly disbelieve), 
4 (unsure), and 7 (strongly believe). Principal components analysis (oblimin rotation) on all Time 1 data (N = 
578) yielded seven components with eigenvalues greater than 1. To simplify the data and to best represent the 
skepticism-course topics, we selected the five or six highest loading items from each component, after splitting 
one component into separate Judeo-Christian/biblical and creationism categories (because only the latter 
reflected course material) and combining a single-item meditation component with the related alternative 
medicine/ healing component (see Table 1); we then averaged the five to six item scores for each belief 
category and for each student (after reverse scoring any items with negative component loadings), and analyzed 
those mean category scores.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We analyzed belief-change data only from the students who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 measures (N = 
190 and N =136 in skepticism and control courses, respectively). Critically, the belief categories we derived 
from the questionnaire were reliably measured: Spearman–Brown test–retest reliabilities for each belief 
category, which were based on control students who completed current-belief measures at both time points (and 
who thus received no intervention or hindsight manipulation; N = 72), ranged from .89 to .97. 
 
A significant four-way interaction among course (skepticism vs. control), time (pre vs. post), postcourse 
questionnaire procedure (current beliefs vs. hindsight), and belief category [F(6,1932) = 3.83, MSe = 0.32, p = 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01], led us to examine each assessment procedure and category separately. In reporting their current 
beliefs (see Figure 1A), students in the skepticism course showed significantly greater pre-to-post decreases 
than did controls in only some of the categories; indeed, the course × time × belief category interaction was 
significant [F(6,1014) = 12.15, MSe = 0.33, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .07]. Except for Judeo-Christian/biblical and 
creationism beliefs, all belief categories showed greater decreases for skepticism-course students than for 
controls [for these course × time interactions, Fs(1,169) ranged from 12.12 to 72.62, ps ≤ .001, and 𝜂𝑝
2s ranged 
from .07 to .30]. Noncreationist Judeo-Christian/biblical beliefs were not addressed in the course materials, and 
creationist beliefs were expected to be difficult to change, particularly in the ―Bible Belt‖ of the southeastern 
U.S. 
 
 
 
 
It was clear, however, that for phenomena related to psychics/ESP, alternative medicine/healing, UFOs/alien 
abductions, astrology, and superstitions/omens, students in the skepticism course reported themselves to be 
much more skeptical of the paranormal and of pseudoscience following the course than they were before and 
reported themselves to be more skeptical than did students in the control courses. Moreover, these significant 
effects came in the context of skepticism- and control-course students reporting statistically identical beliefs on 
the precourse measures: The overall main effect of course at Time 1 was nonsignificant [F(1,169) = 1.22, MSe = 
4.48, p > .27], and for each of the five belief categories showing a course × time interaction above, all main 
effects of course at Time 1 yielded nonsignificant differences [Fs(1,169) < 1. 16, ps > .28]. Skepticism- and 
control-course outcome differences, therefore, were not driven by selection biases. 
 
For students completing the hindsight measure (Figure 1B)—that is, those who attempted to recall their Time 1 
responses at Time 2—the course × time × belief category interaction was, again, significant [F(6,918) = 5.84, 
MSe = 0.31, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04]. Of most importance, for psychics/ESP and alternative medicine/healing 
beliefs—the topics covered most intensely by the skepticism course (see below)—skepticism-course students 
were more likely than controls to remember themselves as more skeptical before the course than they had been 
[course × time interactions: psychics/ESP, F(1,153) = 6.20, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  =.04; alternative medicine/healing, 
F(1,153) = 23.83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .14]. Whereas skepticism- and control-course students reported statistically 
equivalent psychics/ ESP and alternative medicine/healing beliefs before the courses began [psychics/ESP, 
F(1,153) < 1; alternative medicine/healing, F(1,153) = 2.34, MSe = 0.94, p = .13], skepticism-course students, 
postcourse, recalled themselves as having been more skeptical than did control students [psychics/ESP, 
F(1,153) = 4.8 1, MSe = 1.85, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03; alternative medicine/ healing, F(1,153) = 5.69, MSe = 0.99, p < 
.05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04]. Note that these patterns reflected more than just regression to the mean: Skepticism-course 
students’ Time 2 recollections for both psychics/ESP and alternative medicine/healing were further from the 
scale midpoint, and further from the Time 1 and Time 2 control-group recollections, than were their Time 1 
belief reports. 
 
Above, we claim that psychics/ESP and alternative medicine/healing beliefs changed more than did those of 
other paranormal topics because of a systematic treatment effect (i.e., a dose–response relation). Whereas ap-
proximately eight skepticism-class periods (roughly 10 h) were dedicated to psychics/ESP and alternative 
medicine/ healing topics combined, only four and a half class periods (5.6 h) were devoted to 
superstitions/omens, UFOs/ alien abduction, and astrology topics combined. To the extent that video materials 
and live demonstrations increase the vividness, memorability, and long-term impact of messages (see, e.g., 
Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980; Ruscio, 2000), moreover, we offer that, across different semesters, 
psychics/ESP and alternative medicine/ healing topics were supplemented by 18–23 videos (ranging from 4 to 
60 min each) and five demonstrations (from 5 to 60 min each), whereas superstitions/omens, UFOs/ alien 
abduction, and astrology topics were supplemented by only 2–3 videos (ranging from 3 to 60 min each) and 
only two demonstrations (from 5 to 10 min each). The two paranormal topic areas that demonstrated significant 
hindsight-bias effects (and the largest effects on the current-belief questionnaire) thus accounted for almost 
twice as much class time, and almost five times as many video or demonstration activities, as did the three para-
normal topics that showed no hindsight bias; there may be an analogy here to laboratory studies that have found 
hindsight biases to increase with greater frequency of the ―outcome‖ information (e.g., Wood, 1978). 
 
The evidence strongly suggests that the skepticism course effected real and substantial belief change. Not only 
did skepticism-course students report themselves to be currently less credulous regarding paranormal claims 
following the course, but they also recalled themselves as having been more skeptical before the course than 
they had actually been, at least in two primary topic domains. We might have reason to be skeptical, ourselves, 
of the current-belief reports, since they may partially reflect demand characteristics.
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 The hindsight-bias 
procedure, however, tapped into subjects’ beliefs in a way that circumvented demand. Not only has basic 
laboratory research on hindsight indicated minimal social-desirability or motivational influence (Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990), but it is unlikely here that any particular social demand would have led students to feign or 
exaggerate their prior skepticism in only two paranormal domains on the hindsight questionnaires while 
endorsing skepticism in all five (nonbiblical) paranormal domains on the current-belief questionnaire. 
 
In fact, previous research suggests that demand characteristics in our hindsight procedure would have yielded 
the opposite results (see Ross, 1989). In intervention contexts that lead subjects to expect change (study-skills 
courses, pain-treatment programs), but in which little objective change actually occurs, people retrospectively 
adjust their personal recollections ―downward‖ in order to appear more changed (e.g., they recall their initial 
study skills or initial pain levels as having been worse than they actually were; Conway & Ross, 1984; Linton & 
Melin, 1982). Most relevant to present concerns, such downward adjustments can appear in people’s 
recollections of past attitudes as well: Subordinates whose supervisors completed a management-training course 
showed no objective pre-to-post change in their attitudes about work (commitment to the team, sense of 
direction), but after their boss’s course they remembered themselves as having originally had worse attitudes 
than they reported at the time (Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Taylor, 2009). In the context of the present study, then, any 
such demand-induced biases should have led our skepticism-course students to support their (unfounded) 
expectation of a change toward skepticism by recalling themselves as having been more credulous than they had 
actually been, rather than more skeptical than they had been. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our study exploited the hindsight bias to show that, for several deeply covered topics, educational interventions 
reduced paranormal beliefs beyond the effects of demand characteristics. Of broader significance, the findings 
indicate that any intervention program that creates and measures psychological change may circumvent demand 
effects by harnessing hindsight: People who truly change may misremember themselves as having been just as 
they are now. Indeed, regarding the pseudoscientific claims of psychics and alternative healers, our skepticism-
course students believed that they had ―pooh-poohed it all along.‖ 
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NOTES 
 
1. Only some of the samples from Dougherty (2004) and Gray (1985) were compared with controls; Wesp 
and Montgomery (1998) compared skepticism-course students with controls in thinking skills, but they 
did not evaluate students’ beliefs. 
 
2. Because the alternative medicine/healing composite measure included two items with fairly low factor 
loadings (see Table 1), we reran the relevant ANOVAs using a second composite that included only the 
three high-loading items. This three-item composite yielded slightly lower mean endorsement ratings 
than those we report for the full, five-item composite, but the statistical patterns (all main effects and 
interactions) were unchanged. 
 
3. Of course, with the current-belief procedure there is simply no way to determine exactly how much 
influence demand characteristics might be having on subjects’ responses (this is what motivated our use 
of the hindsight procedure, after all). At the same time, we do not believe that students’ reports of their 
current beliefs were driven entirely by demand characteristics, because they reported belief change 
selectively. Note that skepticism students did not report being less believing of creationism claims at the 
end of the course, despite the devotion of significant lecture and reading material to discussing 
creationism as a pseudoscientific system. If demand had been overwhelmingly responsible for students’ 
belief reports, they would have indicated significant belief change in creationism. 
 
